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Important Matters in Political Context
Byungkyu Lee, Peter Bearman
Columbia University
Abstract: The 2004 General Social Survey (GSS) reported significant increases in social isolation
and significant decreases in ego network size relative to previous periods. These results have been
repeatedly challenged. Critics have argued that malfeasant interviewers, coding errors, or training
effects lie behind these results. While each critique has some merit, none precisely identify the cause
of decreased ego network size. In this article, we show that it matters that the 2004 GSS—unlike
other GSS surveys—was fielded during a highly polarized election period. We find that the difference
in network size between nonpartisan and partisan voters in the 2004 GSS is larger than in all other
GSS surveys. We further discover that core discussion network size decreases precipitously in the
period immediately around the first (2004) presidential debate, suggesting that the debate frames
“important matters” as political matters. This political priming effect is stronger where geographic
polarization is weaker and among those who are politically interested and talk about politics more
often. Combined, these findings identify the specific mechanism for the reported decline in network
size, indicate that inferences about increased social isolation in America arising from the 2004 GSS
are unwarranted, and suggest the emergence of increased political isolation.
Keywords: social isolation; political isolation; discussion networks; priming effects; political
polarization; presidential debate
THERE is general consensus in the public and social science community thatpeople are more isolated today than ever before. Part of this idea arises from the
broadly historical recognition that the transition to modernity is characterized by the
breaking of traditional relations that bound individuals to their local communities
and kinship groups. Part of this consensus is more immediate, supported by survey
data that indicates that social isolation has increased and that the size of strong tie
ego networks has decreased. The key set of findings in this regard are identified
by McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears, whose 2006 article reports significant
increases in social isolation and significant decreases in the size of Americans’
discussion networks from the 2004 General Social Survey (GSS), which shows that
the average size of American’s immediate conversational network shrunk by a third
in the two decades from 1985 to 2004.
This finding has not gone unchallenged. Critics have argued that the decrease
in network size, for example, arises not because Americans are more isolated but
instead as a consequence of respondent fatigue (arising endogenously during the
survey) or problems occurring exogenously at the level of the survey organization.
The latter—interviewer malfeasance and coding errors—are easy to dispense with
as the main drivers of change. The former, whether the mechanism is seen as
fatigue or respondent learning arising from order effects (where questions are
located within the survey), is more difficult to reject and in fact was anticipated by
McPherson et al. (2006), who raised and evaluated the impact of question order,
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training, and fatigue on self-reported discussion network size and argued that these
factors had little influence. Our analysis largely supports their claims; although
each critique has some merit, none precisely identify why the size of individuals’
ego networks decreased. This is the task undertaken in this article.
To anticipate our argument, we start with the observation that while people
report a lot of heterogeneous topics—health, finances, local events, new shows on
TV, celebrity salaries, wildlife—when they describe their last important conversation
(Bearman and Parigi 2004; Brashears 2014), as a rule they try to avoid potentially
tense conversations. This is why we try not to get into political conversations with
the parents of our children’s friends at the school barbecue. Politics as a topic
of conversation is fraught with potential risk, and as a consequence, while our
“political matters” discussion networks are a subset of our “important matters”
networks, they are systematically smaller.
But at some times, when it seems as if everyone is talking about politics, people
do talk about politics. In the United States, politics becomes especially salient in
election years and even more so around key moments. Some of those key moments
are local—for example, primaries. But others are national; for example, the first
debate of the presidential candidates following their party conventions. When these
events take place, people are primed to think about politics and this priming shifts
the ways in which they interpret the “important matters” name generator used by
the GSS to capture core strong tie networks. When political matters are primed,
reported network size decreases for the simple reason that people talk with fewer
people about politics than they do about “important matters” more generally. One
of the surprises of the 2004 GSS (in which smaller interpersonal networks were first
observed) is that the survey—in contrast to previous administrations—took place
in the fall of a presidential election year. This turns out to be critical.
Roadmap
Immediately below, we briefly review the extended debate precipitated by the 2004
GSS with respect to increased social isolation in America. This debate centers on
methodological issues because increased isolation was not associated with any
theoretically relevant social changes in the initial publication. We suggest that
political priming allows us to see how political polarization expresses itself on
network size. We then consider the relationship between partisanship and network
size over time to show how temporally polarized contexts matter. Priming can
be political or apolitical, and one way to think about priming effects in surveys is
to consider attention cycles. We show how incredibly short such cycles are using
Google Trends data for the fall of 2004. We then use a Bayesian change point
model to identify the moment of sharpest change in reported network size over the
course of the 2004 GSS survey period. This coincides with peak attention to the first
presidential debate. We show that the priming effect of the debate—the closer to the
debate, the smaller the network size reported—does not suffer from reachability or
prominence bias. Against that background, we consider how priming and context
interact by focusing on polarization within the GSS primary sampling units. Finally,
we discuss the implication of our findings.
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Increasing Social Isolation as Methodological Artifact?
The idea that there were potential exogenous drivers of decreased network size
was first proposed by Fischer (2009), who suggested that a random technical error—
individuals who should have been reported as missing were reported as having
zero discussion partners—artifactually induced the core findings. There was some
truth to the first part of this claim: after Fisher’s critique, the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) announced that 41 cases that had been coded as reporting
zero confidants should have been treated as missing data (Fischer 2009:658). While
there was a coding error (Fisher was right), the error had no effect on the results
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2009). The observation, first proposed by
Paik and Sanchagrin (2013), that some interviewers may have overrepresented iso-
lated individuals—presumably so as to get through their interview more quickly—
appears to be similar. Some interviewers are associated with overreporting isolates,
but it is highly unlikely that this actually matters (cf. Appendix A in the online
supplement).
The idea that isolation is an artifact of order effects is more challenging. Here,
the mechanisms are varied. One idea is that—similar to the so-called overreporting
interviewers—respondents wanted to end the survey more quickly and so didn’t
report talking with others about important matters. This may be because they
learned (from within the survey) that if they identified an organization that they
were a member of, a host of questions about that organization followed. So here,
fatigue and learning as mechanisms overlap. Of course, respondents in 2004 may
have experienced many more surveys of all sorts in which they were trained to
expect “follow-up questions” to any answers they gave. Fatigue on its own may
have played a role. In some of the 2004 GSS administrations, the social network
questions were placed at the end of the already excessively long 90-minute face-to-
face interview.
Throughout this debate, two separate outcomes—proportion isolated and de-
creasing network size—were often conflated. The various mechanisms proposed as
(artifactually) inducing the observation of network change matter differently for
each outcome. For example, McPherson et al. (2009) show that while the coding
errors may necessarily impact network size, the extent of that impact is minor.
Similarly, they acknowledge that coding errors do influence (slightly) the extent of
social isolation, writing, for example “[W]e are pretty sure that there are inflated
zeros in both 1985 and 2004, and we are pretty sure that there are more in 2004 than
in 1985” (2009:674). For McPherson et al., the picture is messy, but the conclusions
they draw are the same—they observe a meaningful decrease in network size.
Using the positional variation in the social network modules in the 2010 GSS,
Fischer (2012) suggests that the 2004 GSS network size decreases may be explained
by training effects arising from question order. We tend to think about training
effects as negative effects, but they need not be. If surveys can get respondents
to think of specific contexts—family, neighborhood, school—they can be “trained”
to recover more names in response to a “name generator.” In this sense, as Bras-
hears (2011) shows, “training” conceptualized as “priming” can lead to more rather
than fewer nominations. Against this background, it is not surprising that Bras-
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hears (2011) shows that the question-order effect—whether an extensively long
battery of voluntary organizational membership questions, each with follow-ups,
preceded the network name generator—is observable on network size but not on
social isolation. That said, correcting for order effects indicates that much of the
observed decrease in network size remains poorly understood—although likely
a consequence of priming rather than fatigue. Brashears’ work has shifted the
focus of debate to decreases in network size where change is marked and not well
understood.
In sum, with respect to the various methodological challenges to the increased
isolation hypothesis, we can simply say that after a number of years of such chal-
lenges, the core result—decreased network size—remains a bit elusive. Why should
we care? Obviously, if the effect is real—that is, if there is no methodological smok-
ing gun—then McPherson et al. (2006, 2009) have empirically identified a really
important social fact about America, one anticipated in the literature, perhaps most
forcefully by Putnam (2000) but articulated in reference to a wide variety of contexts
(Parigi and Henson 2014). And if that is what happened, then it means that we
have to pay more attention to understanding the substantive changes that must
also have happened in America from 1985 to 2004—and beyond—that restructured
the nature of our closest interpersonal networks.
Did We Miss Big Historical Changes?
It is not as if McPherson et al. (2006) didn’t think about the kinds of big historical
changes that might have been operating. Others have followed suit. We can
partition the candidate historical factors into three broad groups: demographic,
technological, and social. It makes sense, as McPherson et al. (2006) first argued,
that demographic shifts in American society could lead to the increasing social
isolation: for example, “As the population gets older and more racially diverse,
we would expect networks to get smaller, since older people and racial minorities
have smaller networks, on average” (p. 367). These candidate changes and others—
increased inequality, work hours, racial diversity, and proportion of the population
living alone—did not drive changes in network size (McPherson et al. 2009). In
fact, demographic stability and the absence of any relationship between the modest
change that was observed led Fischer (2009) to think that there had to be a coding
error of some sort in the first place, because for something real to change, some real
change has to cause it.
With respect to interpersonal networks, it seems almost obvious that the internet
and social media have changed the way people communicate, thereby reshaping
the ways in which people relate to each other (Hampton and Ling 2013; Hampton,
Sessions, and Her 2011; McPherson et al. 2006, 2009; Parigi and Henson 2014;
Sigman 2009). One argument is that the proliferation of new communication
channels arising from technological change makes it easier to maintain weak ties
with otherwise disconnected alters and that this could reduce the number of alters
reported when people are asked to name their close (that is, strong tie) confidants as
in the GSS. But all the evidence suggests the opposite (Hampton et al. 2011; Wang
and Wellman 2010; Zhao 2006)—the use of new technology is positively associated
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with network size. In any case, the argument is basically anachronistic. Facebook,
for example, was launched in February 2004. When the GSS was in the field, it had
fewer than 1 million members and was not open to the public. The online social
network/Internet revolution hadn’t happened.
The body of scholarship focused on increasing social fragmentation broadly
captures the obvious social changes salient for interpersonal networks. Independent
of segregation dynamics, one strand of the social fragmentation hypothesis focuses
on the way in which people organize their relationships. Here, the idea is that
the changing patterns of associational life may have an implication for network
size. Less civic engagement and participation in community activity reduces op-
portunities to interact with others, thereby leading to decreases in network size
(McPherson et al. 2006, 2009; Putnam 2000; Wellman 1979). This is a good idea,
but empirically, neither the level of informal social participation nor the extent of
associational membership changed significantly between 1985 and 2004 (Marsden
and Srivastava 2012; Paxton 1999; Schwadel and Stout 2012). One can imagine
that the relationship between voluntary associational memberships and network
size changed over this period, but this is not the case. The correlation between the
number of voluntary association memberships and the number of confidants is
almost identical over the same time period (McPherson et al. 2009). Thus, reduced
opportunities for social interaction arising from the loss of community does not
explain the smaller networks reported in 2004.
The loss of community thesis also invokes increasing segregation across diverse
demographic traits, most notably race, ethnicity, and class (Fischer and Mattson
2009). At the limit, increasing segregation in contexts in which the number of
potential interlocutors is fixed (as it is in the GSS) inevitably leads to a decrease in
network size (Rytina and Morgan 1982). But this limit is not even approximated
empirically, and while spatial and residential segregation has increased across all of
these traits, McPherson et al. (2006) and later Smith et al. (2014) show that within
the GSS strong tie network, the extent of network homogeneity across different
demographic dimensions is remarkably similar from 1985 to 2004 after accounting
for changes in population composition.
Critically, for us, increased attitudinal segregation, often thought about as po-
litical polarization, has been largely ignored. As we show subsequently, increased
polarization—a form of social fragmentation—drives network size declines but
only at specific moments and most acutely for specific individuals. The key to the
puzzle of “for whom and at what times” hinges on how name generators work.
The “Important Matters” Name Generator
The “important matters” name generator has a distinguished provenance. It has
been repeatedly instrumented in network surveys and is believed to capture the
core of one’s interpersonal strong tie network (Burt 1984; Marsden 1987; McPherson
et al. 2006) despite a long history of criticism since its introduction in the 1985 GSS
(Bailey and Marsden 1999; Bearman and Parigi 2004; Fischer 1982; Marin 2004; Paik
and Sanchagrin 2013; Small 2013). Defenders have long noted that the network
characteristics obtained through the “important matters” name generator do not
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significantly differ from those obtained from differently worded name generators
such as “strong tie”, “emotionally close tie,” or “significant people” (Mollenhorst,
Völker, and Flap 2008; Straits 2000). But even if similar network characteristics
(e.g., homophily or network density) are observed across diverse name generators,
one cannot infer that these name generators capture network ties that are actually
important to respondents. In his study of an online survey of more than 2,000
Americans, Small (2013), for example, found that half of the people talk about
important matters with nonimportant alters, and almost half of the important alters
are not included in ego’s core discussion networks. Small concluded:
“The core discussion network is not a representation of our strong ties;
it is a combination of the people we are close to, people we are not
close to but who are knowledgeable about the matters we regularly find
important, and people we are not close to but who are available because
of our routine activities” (2013:481).
It has also been long known that the topics people report talking about when
they respond to the “important matters” (or similar) name generator consist of
variety of important and trivial topics including, “cloning headless frogs” (Bearman
and Parigi 2004), “my husband’s affair with my sister” (Small 2013), and “KFC
changing the color of their bucket” (Brashears 2014). It is not necessarily that
respondents are vacuous: As Brashears argues, people discuss seemingly trivial
topics because they “are important simply because they are issues that concern
those who are important to us” (2014:506). What matters to most people (and their
interlocutors) are topics that are right in front of them, temporally—topics that enter
into our issue-attention cycle (Downs 1972). For brief periods of time, people care
about natural disasters, mass shootings, or dishonest politicians. These topics are,
under normal conditions, what flows through networks generated by “emotionally
close,” “significant,” or “important matters” name generators1. The social and
political contexts in which the important matters name generator is given matter
not only by shaping what is talked about but who one talks with. If the “important
matters” name generator induces different ideas about what is important, because
of the timing of the survey—and what is immediately within the respondents’
attention cycle—those topics influence who comes to mind. The really unusual
thing about the 2004 GSS, in contrast to earlier and later GSS administrations, is
that it took place in the fall of a presidential election year.
Issue-Attention Cycles during the 2004 Presidential
Election Period
If the salient issue is not particularly contentious and/or positions on that issue are
not highly polarized (for example, very few people do not genuinely feel sad when
natural disasters occur, and even hardened gun advocates are upset—or indicate
such—when children are gunned down by a mass shooter), people feel free to talk
about the issue with many others. But highly contentious and polarized issues
are different. People only talk about contentious issues with people they feel safe
sharing their opinion with (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982). By the fall of
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2004, the political polarization we now take for granted in the United States had
largely solidified (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008)2, with
network effects that encouraged homophilious group formation to avoid partisan
dissonance (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1988). To
a great extent, Americans are now sorted along partisan lines and discuss politics
with like-minded people. An interesting and important consequence is that people
who are not yet sorted in political discussion networks are increasingly segregated.
We know that people’s interpretation of the important matters name generator
is strongly subject to survey context (Brashears 2011; Eagle and Proeschold-Bell
2015; Small, Deeds Pamphile, and McMahan 2015). From Downs (1972), we know
that attention cycles are short. Salient events attract public attention and shape
the interpretative context but only for short periods of time. It follows, then, that
events that channel public attention to politics channel the topics that come to mind
in response to the important matters name generator to political matters. If the
issue-orienting event is political, then the important matters people discuss will be
more likely to be about political matters than, say, disasters. It turns out that this is
easily testable.
Panel A in Figure 1 shows the issue-attention cycle from September to December
2004 based on Google Trends data. In the fall of 2004, while people searched for
specific things at different times, their attention to any given issue was short lived.
Here, we can see bursts of interest in hurricanes, CSI, the presidential debate, the
flu, the (Boston) Red Sox, the presidential election, and finally turkey, presumably
for Thanksgiving dinner3. Panel B shows how frequently people searched for one
of the two main presidential candidates (Bush and Kerry) over the same period. It
is reasonable to assume that the frequency of Google searches for the presidential
candidates tracks the publics’ attention to and interest in political matters (broadly
construed) during the election period. The search volume for both Bush and Kerry
peaked the day after the election (November 3rd). Not surprisingly, the second
largest search volume occurred the day after the first presidential debate (October
1st). The sharp peaks in public attention reported in panel B show that these two
events are obviously salient with respect to political matters. We focus on the first
presidential debate in our study4.
The Sharp Moment of Intense Priming: The First Presidential Debate
in 2004
Earlier we noted that under normal conditions, people talk about the issues that are
important to them—issues that are front and center in their attention cycle. When
the important matters name generator is asked is itself important. The fact that the
2004 GSS was in the field during the presidential election provides us with a unique
opportunity to see how timing matters.
We tend to think that years are homogeneous temporal units, but obviously,
with respect to the ways in which temporal context shapes respondents, they are
heterogeneous. Consider 2004. The 2004 GSS was administered from August 18th
to January 3rd. When the survey was first fielded, almost a month had passed
since the Democratic Convention that formalized the nomination of John Kerry,
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Figure 1: Issue-attention cycles in the fall of 2004 based on Google Trends analysis. Note: The Google search
index, obtained by Google Trends analysis, shows the share of queries for the search keyword with respect
to the total volume of queries for each particular keyword within four months (September 1st through
December 31st) in the United States. In panel A, the maximum query share in the specified time period
is normalized to be 100 for each search term during the period. Therefore, the meaningful comparison is
between different moments in time within a particular search and not between different searches within a
particular moment in time.
whose competition (Dean and Clark) was especially hapless, at least electorally. The
Republican Convention that formally nominated George Bush was yet to occur. For
most Americans, political issues were less salient in the dog days of summer than
spending some time working on their tan on the beach or getting their kids ready
for school. But this quiescence changed, most markedly in the days surrounding
the buildup towards (and fallout from) the first presidential debate on September
30th.
On September 30th, six weeks into the fieldwork with twelve weeks to follow,
over 62 million people—more than at any time since 1980 and more than would
watch at any time until 2012—watched the first presidential debate (Kenski and
Stroud 2005). The election—and political matters specifically—were front and
center in the issue-attention cycle for the brief period before and after the debate. If
priming matters, which it does, then the first presidential debate defines the context
for important matters as, well, “political matters” (Benoit, Hansen, and Verser 2003).
Political scientists have been asking Americans about their discussion networks
for years using a GSS name generator strategy that differs in only one respect
from the 2004 survey; instead of asking about “important matters” they ask about
“political matters” (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Zuckerman 2005). The
networks that they induce in response to this name generator are always smaller
than those that arise from the important matters name generator5. So, if the debate
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primed respondents to think about important matters as political matters, then we
ought to anticipate that their networks—for the short period of time in which the
political context occupied their attention cycle—were smaller. This turns out to be
the case.
Given temporal heterogeneity with respect to both polarization and political
priming, we would not expect the reported declines in network size to be the
same across the whole survey period. Just as we observe temporal variation in
polarization, we can observe marked spatial variation at the level of GSS primary
sampling units. Net of time, some counties are more polarized than others, and we
would anticipate that spatial polarization shapes respondent reports. Thus, the local
temporal and spatial context with respect to polarization is critical to understanding
how respondents responded to the important matters name generator. Tying all
these pieces together requires thinking about how local context, priming, name
generators, and individual social networks intersect.
Who Talks to Whom about What, When, and Where?
Who talks to whom about what (important matters or political matters), when
and where is the key issue we need to solve. Temporal priming events, like the
presidential debate, will manifest themselves more for more political individuals.
Individuals who are largely nonpolitical will be less sensitive to a prime like the
presidential debate because that prime will not lead them to change the topics they
consider important. At the same time, these kinds of temporal priming events
filter through local contexts, and their effects are thus shaped by the structure of
that context—that is, the opportunities that people embedded within them have
for finding and reporting on discussion partners (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987). A
central feature of those contexts, for us, is the extent to which they are segregated,
or polarized ideologically. In some ways, the answer about local context is simple:
where everyone agrees with one another, priming events (like watching a debate)
will not lead to risky conversations. Where there is a lot of disagreement, people
will avoid talking about matters that would allow for that disagreement to arise
(Gerber et al. 2012). They could talk about the weather, and they could think that
the weather was “important,” but the prime shifts their framework. They know
that the weather is not important and that politics is important, and the reality is
that they talk to fewer people and report that fact.
In highly polarized environments, where individual networks are segregated,
network homophily is high and so people discuss whatever topics they discuss—
including political matters—with like-minded people (Baldassarri and Bearman
2007). In such contexts, people are aware that they agree with one another. Thus,
priming has little influence. However, in less polarized environments, where
individual networks are intermingled with respect to the partisan identity, people
know they may disagree with one another and so to avoid political confrontations,
they selectively talk about other topics (Cowan and Baldassarri 2016). In such
settings, the priming effect has a large influence.
As the summer of 2004 ended and thinking about tans gave way to thinking
about politics, discussion networks around politically important matters in an
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increasingly polarized America became increasingly shut down. This happened
more in communities with low levels of polarization than in communities that were
already highly polarized. Political priming has a more intense suppression effect on
conversations in which ideological segregation is less pronounced because it is in
those settings that people eschew potentially contentious conversations. In highly
segregated communities, this effect is weaker.
Data and Methods
We use the GSS egocentric network data arising from the “important matters”
name generator collected in 1985, 1987, 2004, and 2010 and the American National
Election Studies (ANES) “political discussion” network data collected in 2000 and
2006. The 1985, 1987, and 2010 GSS surveys were fielded in the spring and summer
of nonpresidential election years. The 2004 GSS and 2000 ANES data were collected
during presidential election years, though the 2000 ANES was collected after the
election. ANES collected both “important matters” and “political matters” data
in 2006, in telephone interviews, as part of survey experiments during the fall of
the midterm election year. The GSS data and the 2000 ANES data arise from an
in-person interview.
The dependent variable is discussion network size, measured by the number
of alters invoked by the network name generators. The questions about name
generators used in each survey are similar but not precisely the same. Network size
ranges from zero to six in the “important matters” name generator in the GSS data,
but the maximum number of alters in the “political matters” name generator is four
in the 2000 ANES and 10 in the 2006 ANES data. For comparability, we top-code
network size of ANES data at six, although our results become stronger without
top-coding.
The 2000 ANES asked:
From time to time, people discuss government, elections and politics with
other people. I’d like to ask you about the people with whom you
discuss these matters. These people might or might not be relatives.
Can you think of anyone? IF LESS THAN 4 NAMES MENTIONED,
PROBE: “Is there anyone else you talk with about these matters?”
The 1985 GSS and 2004 GSS asked:
From time to time, most people discuss important matters with other
people. Looking back over the last six months—who are the people
with whom you discussed matters important to you? Just tell me their
first names or initials. IF LESS THAN 5 NAMES MENTIONED, PROBE:
“Anyone else?”
The 2006 ANES pilot study asked:
During the last six months, did you talk with anyone face-to-face, on the
phone, by email, or in any other way about [things that were important
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to you / government and elections], or did you not do this with anyone
during the last six months? What are the initials of the people who you
talked with face-to-face, on the phone, by email, or in any other way
during the past six months, about [things that were important to you /
government and elections]? RECORD UP TO 10 NAMES. AFTER EACH
NAME, “Who else?” UNTIL UNPRODUCTIVE OR THREE NAMES
ARE ENTERED.
Analytic Strategy
We employ diverse strategies to show how priming mechanisms suppress core
discussion network size in the 2004 GSS data. First, we show how much of the
daily variance of network size is attributable to interview timing. To account for
the fact that our dependent variable is generated by a count process, we employ
random-intercept poisson regression models treating the date of survey as a level
2 unit across the ANES and GSS data. We assess the significant presence of daily
variance using likelihood ratio tests (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Identifying
significant daily variation is an essential step towards establishing that survey
timing matters, especially in the 2004 GSS data.
Next, we situate the 2004 GSS data in broader political context to show how
political polarization and partisanship interact across two decades. We pay special
attention to the 2000 ANES data that collected political discussion networks right
after the election period as a useful point of comparison to the 2004 GSS data. Fol-
lowing McPherson et al. (2006, 2009)’s strategy, we estimate zero-inflated poisson
regression models to handle the overdispersion of core discussion network size.
Our independent variable in this analysis is party identification. By comparing
the difference in differences of network size between partisans (Republicans or
Democrats) and nonpartisans (Independents) across periods characterized by differ-
ent levels of political polarization, we can identify how nonpartisans are less likely
than partisans to talk about important or political matters, depending on political
context. In the statistical models, we include standard demographic characteristics
known to be related to network size such as age, years of education, sex, race,
marital status, working status, and the number of children as pretreatment control
variables, which would not affect party identification. All variables’ wording and
coding are presented in Table B1 in the online supplement.
We then we shift our attention to priming within the 2004 GSS data. The entire
survey period in 2004 was highly political because of the polarized presidential
election, but the level of political priming peaked sharply (as shown in Figure 1)
in the period around the first presidential debate. That debate is the treatment of
our analysis. The date of the interview is our instrument to explore the effects of
political events (i.e., the first presidential debate) on reported network size. We
largely follow the lead of other recent studies that employ a regression discontinuity
design to compare the mean before and after a particular date, treating events as
exogenous random shocks leading to differential responses (Hoffman and Bearman
2015; Legewie 2013).
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T =
{
0 if respondent i was interviewered before the event
1 if respondent i was interviewed after the event
(1)
T = t0 if the respondent i was interviewed at t0 days before or after the event (t0 > 0) (2)
As in Equation (1), the treatment indicator in prior studies is whether each
respondent is interviewed after the event occurs. However, we are interested in
the pattern of change before and after an event, given that the event focused on in
this article—the first debate—is one of a class of events that are anticipated by our
respondents. Our expectation is that as the GSS interviews approach the date of the
first presidential debate, people will report fewer discussion partners. Likewise, as
the debate recedes out of the issue-attention cycle, respondents will report larger
discussion networks. We model this V-pattern around the first presidential debate
by estimating the effect of the elapsed time from the day of the event within moving
calipers. Rather than assume pre-fixed duration effects, we employ continuous
treatment indicators as a linear indicator in Equation (2). This enables us to report
the full range of all treatment effects for all (theoretically plausible) moving calipers6.
Of interest is the width of the caliper both before and after an event because
we do not know a priori how long the debate exerts its influence. To address this
issue, we need to ascertain the probability of change in network size at each point in
time during whole period. We employ a Bayesian change point model to estimate
the probability of observing a sharp change in daily network size using the bcp
package in R (Erdman and Emerson 2007). To account for the different number
of daily participants across time, we first do a partial pooling using a random
intercept regression model and predict the random intercept (i.e., mean) for each
day. From this we estimate the posterior probability of change points and their
posterior means using the default tuning parameters recommended by Barry and
Hartigan (1993), with a burn-in period of 5,000 draws and mcmc size of 200,000.
The maximum width of the caliper is defined by the two contiguous change points
with the second greatest posterior probabilities arising from the Bayesian change
point model.
We first show a smoothing line by fitting the local regression (i.e., local poly-
nomial regression fitting) to identify trends of network size as a nonparametric
method using the loess function in R package. For statistical tests, we run a simu-
lation to identify how likely it is that we can observe significant effects by chance
alone, which is preferable to conventional statistical null hypothesis testing given
the bias–efficiency tradeoff with regard to the width of moving calipers. Specif-
ically, using poisson regression models for network size, we estimate the debate
effect on the simulated data sets by randomly permuting the survey date of each
participant 1,000 times while all other individual characteristics, including network
size, are fixed. Our simulation strategy induces a situation in which the number of
respondents watching the first debate is the same but those who watch the debate
are different. Differently put, those who watch the debate in a given period are
compared to those who watch it in a randomly assigned period.
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Potential Threats for the Identification of Debate Effects
We assume that interview timing is exogenous to survey participation. However,
a potential threat to our identification strategy might originate from reachability
bias. For example, if for some reason those who participate in the survey around
the debate are more likely to be less educated or unmarried, average network size
around the debate will be smaller not because of the debate per se but because those
less educated and/or unmarried have smaller networks. To test for possible bias,
we first compare characteristics of the sample during the treatment period (t0) to
the rest of period. In doing so, we calculate student t-statistics of mean difference
between the two periods, with survey weights adjusted for pretreatment variables
associated with survey participation for both interviewers and respondents.
Specifically, we include variables that were utilized as controls in prior stud-
ies (Fischer 2009; McPherson et al. 2006, 2009; Paik and Sanchagrin 2013). For
respondents, these include age, sex, education, race, marital status, working sta-
tus, number of children, party identification, and partisan strength. For interview
context, these include interview length, SAQ skip, uncooperativeness, and poor
comprehension. For interviewers, these include interviewers’ sex, age, race, and
tenure. See Table B1 in the online supplement for variable wording and coding.
The model we use rests on the assumption that the first presidential debate is
exogenous to other political events (i.e., the temporal stability assumption) (Legewie
2013:1208) and that it was the most salient event driving network size during the
sample period. To test the assumption, we examine the potential presence of other
salient event effects by presenting all plausible effects of different moving calipers
(t0) across the whole survey period. A final concern is the linearity assumption
underlying the usage of linear treatment indicators. We know that social realities
are complex; for example, one can imagine that debate effects are latent until three
days and suddenly take place at the fourth day. But the power of linear modeling
lies in its simplicity. We test the linearity assumption by comparing one random
intercept poisson model with linear indicators against another with a series of
dummy indicators within each moving caliper using likelihood ratio tests. As we
will show, the model is robust to these three threats.
Interactions with Political Engagement and Geographic Polarization
As discussed earlier, the priming mechanism through which the presidential debate
drives how people interpret the “important matters” name generator should be
more salient for those who are more politically engaged or living in more polarized
neighborhoods. We would expect that their responses are quicker than the other
and thus show a steeper V-pattern. We assess the sensitivity of different subgroups
with respect to the debate by fitting a loess curve across each subgroup.
With respect to individual characteristics, we utilize two variables to measure the
level of political engagement—political discussion frequency and political interest.
We dichotomize them into high engagement (discuss politics often or are very
interested in politics) and low engagement. As for the neighborhood context, we
measure the degree of political polarization in each Primary Sampling Unit (PSU)
in three different ways. First we consider the proportion of people who identify
sociological science | www.sociologicalscience.com 13 January 2017 | Volume 4
Lee and Bearman Important Matters in Context
as moderates on the seven-point political ideology scale in the GSS. Where this
proportion is above the mean, the PSU is considered nonpolarized. Second, we
measure the kurtosis of the same political ideology scale7. When kurtosis is below
the mean, polarization is coded as present. Finally, we measure party sorting by
the correlation between political ideology and party identification. When that
correlation is above the mean, the community is treated as polarized.
Results
The important matters name generator is sensitive to time because what people
consider important—and therefore with whom they report discussing important
matters—is driven by issue-attention cycles. Table 1 reports network size based on
GSS data (in 1985, 1987, 2004, and 2010) and ANES data (in 2000 and 2006), with
survey weights adjusted. The central puzzle is the huge decrease in ego network
size from 2.92 in 1985 to 2.14 in 2004.
Comparison with results from ANES—which employs the “political matters”
name generator—provides support for the idea that people discuss political matters
when they talk about “important matters” in politically contested periods. From
Table 1 it is evident that the proportion of social isolates reported in political discus-
sion networks is always larger than that reported in “important matters” discussion
networks, except for in the 2004 GSS. A survey experiment conducted within the
2006 ANES data confirms the significantly smaller size of political discussion net-
works compared to important matters discussion networks (2.14 versus 2.74; p =
0.052). It may be a coincidence that the size of the 2006 political matters discussion
network produced precisely the same estimate for network size as the 2004 GSS,
but it suggests that the shrunken size of the important matters networks reported in
2004 arises from political priming, which reframes “important matters” to “political
matters”.
We examine the degree to which network size varies across survey dates based
on likelihood ratio tests using a random-intercept poisson model without covariates.
This model reveals that across all GSS surveys, daily network size variation is
largest and significant in 2004 (χ2 = 19.438, p value < 0.001). Importantly, we
observe a negative correlation between daily variance and average network size (r =
−0.46). The absence of significant daily variation observed in the other GSS surveys
supports the idea that what people construe as important matters is relatively stable
in contexts that are not explicitly political. The significant daily variation in 2004
suggests that something unusual happened at the end of September.
The Effect of Increasing Political Polarization across Decades
It is always the case that nonpartisan respondents report talking to fewer people
than partisan respondents about important or political matters. Some set of the
topics of conversation induced by the important matters name generator are politi-
cal (Bearman and Parigi 2004; Brashears 2014), and as one would expect, people
without political attitudes talk less about political matters than those who do have
attitudes (Huckfeldt et al. 2004). Priming, which shifts the framework of the name
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Table 1: Network size and its daily variations during survey period across different datasets.
GSS ANESe GSS ANES 2006 pilotf GSS
1985 1987 2000 2004 moduleA moduleB 2010
Name Generatora imp imp pol imp pol imp imp
% of Social Isolation 0.10 0.06 0.28 0.22 0.38 0.28 0.13
Network Size
Meanb 2.94 2.50 2.29 2.14 2.14 2.74 2.42
SD 1.77 1.28 2.34 1.82 2.18 2.27 1.77
N 1,531 1,800 1,551 1,426 346 316 1,272
Survey Period spring spring winter fall winter winter summer
% Variations across days
Daily variancec (
√
ψ11) 0.002 0.000 0.074 0.169 0.445 0.244 0.059
χ2 0.001 0.000 2.497 19.438 45.422 31.377 0.538
p-valued 0.489 0.500 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232
Notes:
a Name generators are denoted “imp” for “important matters” and “pol” for “political matters.”
b Throughout, mean network size is calculated by top-coding network size at 6.5 with sampling design
adjusted as is conventional.
c It is estimated by random-intercept poisson regression models without any covariates using xtpoisson in
Stata.
d Log-likelihood tests are performed to examine whether daily variances are statistically significant.
e ANES 2000 probed up to four discussion partners, but here we present the mean of top-coded network
size. Without top-coding, it is 1.79.
f In an ANES 2006 pilot study based on a telephone survey, one half of survey respondents were randomly
assigned to a “political/election” name generator (module A), and the other half were assigned to an
“important matters” name generator (module B).
generator from “important matters” to “political matters,” suppresses partisans
and nonpartisans equally, and so—absent any other factor—we would expect to
observe consistent differences in network size. We can see these processes unfold
in Figure 2, which reports the average network size of nonpartisan and partisan
respondents. Figure 2 reports mean network size for respondents who identify
as independents with respect to party identification in comparison to all others
who are leaning towards or identify themselves as partisan (either Democratic or
Republican) across a series of studies in which network data were collected from
1985 to 20108. Across the board, nonpartisan respondents have fewer discussants.
The largest difference is observed in 2004, when political polarization is highest
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008) – precisely because the
2004 GSS was uniquely administered in the fall of a presidential election year.
Recall that our expectation was for no difference, absent any other factor. But
there is an additional factor—polarization. Political priming in the context of politi-
cal polarization drives network size further down. Table 2 reports results from zero-
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Figure 2: Differences of mean network size by party identification across sample surveys. Note: Each X
represents the average network size among those who identify themselves as independent on the party
identification scale, and each circle represents estimates among other members excluding the independent
category. Statistically significant differences between the two are plotted as a solid line, otherwise as a dotted
line.
inflated poisson regression models controlling for standard social-demographic
variables that are associated with network size—age, sex, years of education, race,
marital status, number of children, and working status (also see the full regression
table in Table B2 in the online supplement). Note that zero-inflated poisson regres-
sion models simultaneously take account for the poisson process of counting the
number of alters as well as the zero-inflation process, in which an inflated zero is
modeled given the expected number of zeros from the poisson process.
First, we can observe significant declines in nonpartisans’ network size from
1985 and 1987 (also 2000 and 2010) to 2004 across both model frameworks after
accounting for the zero-inflation process. The key period is 2004. In 2004, non-
partisans talk about important or political matters less than any other period. At
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Table 2: The difference in differences of network size between partisans and nonpartisans across time with
reference to the 2004 GSS data.
Panel A. Zero-inflated poisson regression models among nonpartisan sample.
Reference Year = 1985 1987 2000 2010
Count Model Coefficients (Poisson with log link)
Year = 2004 −0.554† −0.462† −0.324∗ −0.356†
(0.086) (0.083) (0.129) (0.084)
Observations 393 440 412 429
Panel B. Zero-inflated poisson regression models among all sample.
Reference Year = 1985 1987 2000 2010
Count Model Coefficients (Poisson with log link)
Party ID = Independent −0.029 −0.034 −0.049 −0.108
(0.062) (0.047) (0.078) (0.075)
Year = 2004 −0.252† −0.067 −0.025 0.004
(0.037) (0.034) (0.050) (0.035)
Year (2004) × Party ID (Independent) −0.300† −0.313† −0.251∗ −0.216∗
(0.099) (0.090) (0.108) (0.094)
Observations 2,900 3,167 2,913 2,612
Note: We estimate zero-inflated poisson regression models on network size after controlling for respondent’s
age, sex, education, race, marital status, the number of children, and working status (see Table B2 in the
online supplement for full regression tables). The 2000 ANES data investigate the network size up to four,
and so we also top-coded network size of the 2004 GSS data as four in this comparison, but the results are
the same without top-coding.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, † p < 0.01.
the same time, the difference in network size between partisan and nonpartisan
voters in 2004 is statistically much larger than at any other time. These descriptive
results suggest that network size (the number of people individuals discuss things
with) depends on an interaction between characteristics of people and the broader
temporal context. In this case, a priming that transforms “important matters” into
“political natters” suppresses network size for everyone. So does polarization, on its
own. But when political polarization is high, nonpartisan individuals report talking
to others even less. They eschew potentially contentious conversations.
The Priming Effect of the First Presidential Debate
Figure 3, panel A reports the number of survey respondents in each day. Before the
election, roughly 15 people took the survey each day; after the election, roughly five
people took the survey each day. Given the small number of observations around
and after the election, we explore the temporal patterns of network size variation
a month before and after the first presidential debate. Panel B reports—using a
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Figure 3: Network variation around the first presidential debate in 2004. Note: In panel A, the number of
participants who responded to the network name generator on each survey date is plotted across time. In
panel B, each gray dot represents the mean network size per day, and the blue line shows the loess curve
(i.e., local regression estimates) estimated by the loess function in R with the smoothing parameter (α) set to
0.4 (solid line) and 0.15 (dotted line). Estimating the Bayesian change point model (using bcp package in R)
yields the posterior probability of change points on average network size on each day in panel C and its
posterior mean in panel D. The Blue solid line indicates the date (September 28th) that reaches the maximum
posterior probability of change point, and the red solid line indicates the date of the presidential debate
(September 30th), when we observe the smallest posterior mean network size. Two blue dotted lines show
the next largest change points on September 8th and October 23rd.
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three-day moving average t− 1, t, t+ 1)—network size for each survey date, plotted
as gray dots across time from September to October. The loess curves (i.e., local
regression estimators) predicted with two different smoothing parameters in panel
B clearly show that network size is smaller when respondents participated in the
survey closer to the first presidential debate in 2004 (marked by a red vertical line).
Note the V-pattern indicating a precipitous decline and increase in network size
for the first debate, which is present (though more muted) for the second and third
debates.
Panel C shows the posterior probability of change points, and panel D shows
the posterior mean of network sizes from the Bayesian change point model. The
maximum posterior probability for a change point is September 28th (colored by the
red vertical line). This is right before the first presidential debate (September 8th),
colored by the blue vertical line, which is when we observe the smallest posterior
mean network size in panel D. The second largest posterior probabilities before
and after the debate, indicated by dotted red lines, are September 8th and October
23rd—22 days and 24 days away from the debate, respectively. Given the next
largest change points, we define the maximum width of the caliper as 21 days.
Before testing the significance of the V-pattern, we examine the linearity as-
sumption. Table B3 in the online supplement shows the degree to which linear
models lose explanatory power compared to a nonparametric dummy model free
of any parametric assumptions because it estimates all effects of each treatment
day. We conduct likelihood ratio tests after estimating random-intercept poisson
regression models across a range of moving calipers from 1 to 21, and they confirm
the validity of linearity assumption; the linear models do not significantly differ
from the dummy models at the p = 0.05 level. We also evaluate the significance
of the linear trend before and after the debate against null distributions from 1,000
simulations that assign respondents to random survey dates, matching the number
of observations each day (Figure B1 in the online supplement). In this simulation,
respondents retain all of their attributes and characteristics. The only thing that
we allow to vary is the timing in which they complete the survey. Each histogram
reports for each day the null distributions arising from random arrivals. The solid
gray line represents the observed coefficient for the debate effect, and the dotted
black line shows the adjusted coefficient after controlling for the key covariates. For
statistical comparison, we identify the 95th percentile of the simulated distribution
(red lines). The vast majority of both the adjusted and unadjusted coefficients are
significant. This confirms that the observed V-pattern is meaningful and not simply
statistical noise.
The small gaps between adjusted and unadjusted coefficients shown in Figure
B1 across the moving windows imply that survey participation is exogenous to
the presidential debate. In English, this means that whatever reason people may
have had for participating in the survey on a given day, the day they decided to
complete the survey had nothing to do with the debate. Still, we examine the
extent of reachability bias by conducting balancing tests on a range of respondents’
characteristics, reported in Figure B2 in the online supplement. Figure B2 shows
the t-statistics for mean differences on a set of pretreatment confounders included
in the regression model as well as party identification and partisan strength across
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all moving windows. None of covariates significantly differ across a full range of
moving windows from 6 to 21 days, with reference to overall period (panels A and
B). In other words, we find that those who were reached within each caliper (=
|t0 − moving window|) have similar characteristics to those who participated in
the survey out of the caliper. The absence of imbalance in balancing tests confirms
that the reachability bias is not a concern.
The remaining concern is the presence of other prominent events during the
analytic period that could lead to the violation of event exogeneity of the first
presidential debate. This is a testable empirical question. Figure B3 in the online
supplement shows a full range of regression coefficients from estimating poisson
models that change the event date in our treatment indicator (=t0) for all dates in
the fall across a full range of temporal calipers. We find that nearly none of the
regression coefficients in other dates during the period around the first debate are
larger than the coefficients for the first presidential debate (red horizontal lines)
unless the moving window is larger than 16 days. The absence of other events that
politically prime people so as to drive declines in reported network size indicates the
first presidential debate played a more significant role in the issue-attention cycle
than the others during the period9. We next turn to identifying the mechanisms
that motor the ways in which priming effects lead people to report fewer discussion
partners.
Disengagement and the Priming Effect
Logically, it follows that the priming effect should be absent for people not exposed
to the priming event in the first place. The first presidential debate couldn’t prime
individuals who didn’t care about or see it, and as a result, the important matters
they discuss should not suddenly become political even if such political events are
seemingly widely reported in the mass media. Because people see what they want
to see and don’t see what they don’t want to see, we can assess if this is the case.
We know something about the characteristics of individuals that lead them to be
more or less politically engaged, and it is this engagement that has to be associated
with caring (even a little) about the presidential debate. In Figure 4, we report how
individual characteristics salient for political engagement, political interest, and
political discussion frequency interact with the priming effect. Panels A and B show
that those who are very interested in politics or discuss politics frequently are more
sensitive to the priming effect than others. They were probably some of the 62
million people who watched the debate.
Community Polarization and the Priming Effect
While there is no restriction in the GSS to select discussion partners from ones’
neighborhood, it is often the case that recent conversations with people about im-
portant matters are with people from ones’ community, and to the extent to which
this is true, the local context defined by the characteristics of people residing in
ego’s community plays a role in shaping what people feel comfortable discussing
(Mollenhorst, Volker, and Flap 2014). Because most people strive to avoid dissonant
or uncomfortable conversations, the presence or absence of ideological segregation
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Figure 4: The interaction effects of priming with political engagement at the individual level. Note: Each
circle represents the mean network size for the three days around each survey date (t-1,t,t+1), and each line
shows the loess curve estimated by the loess function in R package with smoothing parameter (α) set to 0.4
depending on each category; Political Interest is dichotomized into High (very interested) and Low (rest);
Political Discussion is dichotomized into High (discuss politics often) and Low (rest).
in the local environment provides an efficient description of the context in which
such conversations can occur. It also provides us with an opportunity to construct a
risky test of our theory in a different context: if we are right that people will try to
avoid dissonant conversations when they are primed to think about important mat-
ters as political matters, then it should be the case that reported discussion networks
are smaller in less polarized communities. This follows because in nonpolarized
communities, the chances are greater than in polarized communities that one might
talk to someone whose views differ.
Figure 5, panels A–C report distributions of these variables. Consistent with
our expectation, Figure 5, panels D–E show that those who live in low-polarized
PSUs—across all three measures—report smaller networks around the first presi-
dential debate. However, those who live in high-polarized PSUs consistently report
similarly sized network across time. Initially, this would appear counterintuitive.
But reflection indicates it is not. Our discussion networks are composed of people
who are like us. In polarized communities, Democrats talk to Democrats and Repub-
licans talk to Republicans about important matters. Priming that turns important
matters into political matters has little effect because they already know that they
agree. Their neighborhoods and their networks are polarized politically already.
In nonpolarized neighborhoods, this is not the case. Democrats may well talk
about important matters with Republicans. Because polarization is absent, political
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Figure 5: Priming and spatial political polarization in 2004. Note: We measure political polarization in each
PSU (sampcode) in three different ways and plot their distribution. Panel A reports the proportion of moderate
respondents, panel B reports the kurtosis of political ideology, and the correlation coefficient between party
identification and political ideology is reported in panel C. We dichotomize each measure based on its mean
value and plot the mean network size per day as differently colored circles by level of polarization: low
(blue) and high (red). As in Figure 4, the smoothed means for network size are plotted as sky blue or pink
circles—depending on the level of political polarization—with the loess curves overlaid.
beliefs are not salient in choosing discussion partners. But a priming event that
reframes “important matters” to “political matters” makes a difference for people
in nonpolarized communities. Suddenly, the important matter is a political matter,
and the conversation that can occur is fraught with potential danger. In response,
people talk to fewer people, which reduces the size of their discussion network.
So far, our theory has survived two reasonable risky tests. We show that there
really were smaller networks in 2004, and those smaller networks arose for a very
specific reason: respondents were primed to think about political (rather than
important) matters and answered interviewer questions with that framework in
mind.
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Discussion
Do Americans have fewer close confidents with whom they talk about important
matters than they did in the 1980s? The most robust evidence that they do is found
in the 2004 GSS, which reported seemingly inexplicable declines in the size of our
closest interpersonal networks (McPherson et al. 2006). Because the causes of
this change were largely unexplained in the original article, and because none of
the factors thought to shape network size changed sufficiently to account for the
observed decrease, scholars have eagerly searched for the supposed methodological
smoking gun that invalidates the survey. This article suggests that they have been
largely unsuccessful10—that there is “nothing wrong” with the 2004 GSS network
instrument or the findings arising from it. At the same time, this article shows that
we cannot make inferences about social change from those results because they are
not comparable to earlier or later GSS social network surveys. In this regard, there
is a smoking gun. The “gun” is time, the “bullet” is priming.
For a couple of weeks in the middle of the field period, Americans really talked
to fewer people about “important matters” because the first presidential debate and
the entire presidential election period primed respondents to think that “important
matters” were “political matters” and eschewed potentially conflictual conversa-
tions. Nothing like that happened before or after, because no previous General
Social Survey with a battery of network questions was conducted in the fall of a
presidential election year.
Scholars agree that there is increased political polarization in the United States
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and
Goldberg 2014; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Prior 2013). Talking about politics is
potentially uncomfortable when polarization is marked, especially in highly po-
larized contexts, in which the attitudes of others may not be known (Cowan and
Baldassarri 2016). If this is the case, it follows that nonpartisans should have fewer
discussion partners when they think that the important matters of the day are polit-
ical matters. This is not the case for partisans. While their networks may become
somewhat smaller, they can still easily have conversations with partisan friends
whose opinions on politics they are sure of and which concord with their own.
Against this background, many Americans are at risk of “political isolation.” In
such a situation, our capacity to have a meaningful public discourse about politics
may be significantly lessened.
There is some additional evidence to support this idea. During the fall of the
2016 U.S. presidential election, widely thought to be the nastiest and most partisan
to date, we collected network size data using the “important matters” and “political
matters” network name generators from 1,055 American adults using the Time
Sharing Experiment for Social Sciences (TESS) platform11. Our results show that
the average reported discussion network size is very small (1.4). As we have tried
to argue, this does not mean that Americans are more isolated than ever before.
But it does mean that Americans are politically isolated—they really do have fewer
people that they talk to about political matters. While the link between this fact and
the hollowing out of substantive content in politics is speculative, it is, we believe,
a speculation worth considering.
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For a long time, we have known that the “important matters” name generator
is sensitive to survey context. If the network battery followed questions about
education, for example, people would report that their last important conversation
was about education (Bailey and Marsden 1999)! But what we never considered was
how temporal context shapes how the important matters name generator works12.
This article shows that temporal context, identified more than 40 years ago by
Anthony Downs as driven by issue-attention cycles, is absolutely critical for that
understanding. In the fall of 2004, around the first presidential debate, respondents
were primed to think about politics when they thought about important matters,
and when they did, they reported talking to fewer people than ever before. This was
especially true for people living in communities characterized by greater structural
opportunity to talk with diverse others with respect to political beliefs.
More than 60 million Americans watched the first presidential debate in 2004.
The people who watched the debate cared more about politics than those who did
not (Kenski and Stroud 2005). The run-up to the debate and the discussion that
followed it dominated other issues competing for attention at the end of September
2004, and so it follows that if the priming mechanism we identify as shifting focus
from important to political matters operates, it should impact those more interested
in politics than those less interested. We show that this is the case. The strikingly
steep decline in network size for just a few weeks around the first presidential
debate is real, but it is momentary. The short-lived nature of priming effects reflects
the limited attention space in people’s minds as well as the public arena (Hilgartner
and Bosk 1988). What can we learn from that fact?
One thing we can learn is methodological. There is a whole body of very good
scholarship that has concentrated on developing a variety of statistical methods
to analyze panel data with a focus on how individual responses vary from panel
to panel (Morgan and Winship 2014; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012), all the
while assuming that responses within each panel are constant. The results of this
article show that this assumption is not warranted. It tells us that we need to
pay much more attention to the role of the temporal (unobserved) heterogeneity
in the identification of causal effects and estimation of population parameters,
whether or not one has a representative sample. Other work has contributed to this
demonstration as well. For example, terrorist attacks that happened during survey
fieldwork shape survey respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants (Legewie 2013)
and fans of winning basketball teams in the 2009 NCAA men’s college basketball
tournament rated President Obama’s job performance more positively after they
won than before (Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010). Temporal context gets under
the skin of surveys. In our case, temporal context shapes the ways in which
people interpret questions they are asked (Jerolmack and Khan 2014). This changes,
necessarily, the answers that they give.
We live in the world of replication crisis. It is easy to find some statistically
significant effects just by chance, though it is hard to replicate the same effects (Lee
and Conley 2016; Open Science Collaboration 2015). The solution to this problem is
to secure more precision in the identification of causal mechanisms in addition to
the identification of causal estimates. In this article, we believe we have identified
the precise mechanism that led to decreased network size in 2004. That we see the
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trace of the same process in our data from 2016 is both reassuring with respect to
our argument and deeply distressing with respect to the prospects for meaningful
conversation about important political matters and the rise of political isolation.
Notes
1 For example, Bearman and Parigi (2004) said “at the time of our data collection, stories
concerned the “nanny” in Boston who murdered her charge, a state trooper who was
shot on interstate 95, road construction projects, moral issues in the Clinton White House,
and trouble in the livestock (specifically pig) industry . . . were frequently discussed” (p.
537).
2 The literature on political polarization is split into those who see mass polarization
(i.e., the opinion distribution of the electorate has become more extreme and bimodal)
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) and those who see party sorting (i.e., the opinion
distribution remains unimodal, but the alignment of partisanship and ideology has
become tighter) (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). For our purposes, this does not matter
because the interpersonal network effects downstream are the same for both models.
3 Note that our goal in this exercise is not to investigate the entire space for all different
(issue) domains but to illustrate the short-lived nature of the issue-attention cycle using
some selected examples. Of course there are many issues that don’t take off while other
issues compete with one another at the same time. We address these points in panel
B, which tracks the relative level of public attention to “political matters” within the
political domain over time.
4 We focus on the priming effects of the first presidential debate rather than the presidential
election in this study because only a few individuals were surveyed for the 2004 GSS
survey around November 1st.
5 While Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe (2009) argue that the network characteristics reported
from these two name generators are not statistically different, the political matters name
generator consistently yields fewer names than the important matters name generator. It
is worth observing, however, that the data (the 1996–1997 Indianapolis–St. Louis Study)
they used contain numerous political survey items that could have primed respondents
so as to frame important matters as political matters. Sokhey and Djupe (2014) also
reported smaller network size from the political matters name generator.
6 The fact that the first presidential debate in 2004 took place around the acute change point
supported by the predictive model does tell how long its effects will persist within the
maximum caliper compared to the counterfactual situation of its absence. For example,
if we assume that the debate will suppress the core discussion network linearly for a
week, then the linear treatment indicator will have an effect among respondents who
participate in the survey within a week before and after the debate but not within two
weeks.
7 Following Baldassarri and Bearman (2007)’s strategy, we compute the kurtosis—which
captures the bimodality of distribution—as kurtosisj =
∑Ni=1(pi−µj)4
Nσ4j
− 3, where pi is an
individual i’s political ideology score, µj and σj are the mean and the standard deviation
of political ideology in the neighborhood j, and N is the number of individuals in
neighborhood j.
8 Normally one would measure polarization using the political ideology battery in the GSS,
but the 2004 GSS did not collect political ideology information for those who responded
to the network name generator.
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9 Logically, and probably empirically as well, the election would have primed in the same
manner, but the small N of respondents in the days immediately before and after the
election means that inferences about around the election are unreliable.
10 It is worth observing that while the prior attempts to identify why Americans reported
having smaller networks in 2004 than at any other time were largely unsuccessful, many
of the articles had the intuition that political events during the survey period may have
played a role. For example, McPherson et al. (2006) stated: “What American considered
important might well have shifted over the past two decades, perhaps as a result of
major events . . . If people think of ‘important’ more in terms of national and world-level
events, more people might now think that they have nothing important to say” (p. 372).
Likewise, Fischer (2009) wrote: “One might speculate, for example, that being questioned
during a spring [sic] full of heated discussion about war and presidential primaries may
have led many respondents to interpret ‘important matters’ as political matters” (p. 668).
11 This result comes from analysis of data arising from a survey experiment entitled,
“Networks in Time: Testing Contextual Effects in the 2004 General Social Survey Network
Items.”
12 Of course, there is a body of scholarship that studies the sensitivity of the recall period
(i.e., “the last six months”) in network name generators (Sokhey and Djupe 2014) as well
as change in core discussion networks across individual life trajectories (Mollenhorst
et al. 2014; Small et al. 2015). However, neither approach treats temporal context as
a situational structure constituted by real-time events that shape individuals’ action
frameworks.
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